Abstract-We investigate the problem of secure communication in a simple network with three communicating parties, two distributed sources who communicate over orthogonal channels to one destination node. The cooperation between the sources is restricted to a rate limited common random source they both observe. The communication channels are erasure channels with strictly causal channel state information of the destination available publicly. A passive adversary is present in the system eavesdropping on any one of the channels. We design a linear scheme that ensures secrecy against the eavesdropper. By deriving an outer bound for the problem we prove that the scheme is optimal in certain special cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade we have significantly deepened our fundamental understanding on how to send information over wireless networks -while our understanding on how to securely send this information has not reached the same depth as yet. Network coding, interference alignment and the deterministicapproximation approach are examples of powerful techniques that take advantage of the network environment to enable information transfer at substantial bandwidth and throughput benefits. But if we also want to send this information securely, we have not yet developed a comparable set of techniques.
In this paper, we take the first steps in understanding how we can construct security in erasure networks with (erasure state) feedback. We want to use three resources wireless networks offer: the existence of feedback (today part of all wireless standards); the possibility of selecting and using multiple paths; and the wireless channel variability and unpredictability. We note that several interesting works have looked at secrecy over networks [1] - [4] , but without feedback: yet it is well known that even for a point-to-point channel, use of feedback can significantly increase the achievable secrecy rates [5] - [7] .
Our starting point are two insights from our previous work [7] , [8] , where we have looked at the secret message capacity of a source, Alice sending private messages to multiple receivers through a broadcast erasure channel with state feedback. First, in all cases where we were able to characterize the message capacity, it was optimal to use an achievability scheme with two phases, a key-generation and a key-consumption phase. That is, we create in the first phase a secret key between the source Alice and each user (say Bob), and in the second phase use this key to encrypt the private message Alice has to send. Second, we showed that the amount of key we need to secure a message can be much smaller than the message itself, unlike the classical one-time pad that requires a message-length key.
To these two insights, we add in this paper a first understanding on how to use common randomness across intermediate network nodes. We started our work from the relay (diamond) network depicted in Figure 1a , where we aim to secure a unicast session from S to D against Eve, who can eavesdrop through a broadcast erasure channel at an (unknown) node. Note that when the source Alice broadcasts random packets with the purpose of key generation, these might be overhead by L 1 , or L 2 , or both, in the latter case creating common randomness. In fact, Alice can control the amount of common randomness through retransmissions and coding schemes. A crucial observation we extracted from our preliminary examination of the diamond network is that, the performance of secrecy schemes is significantly affected by this amount of common randomness the intermediate nodes
To understand how much common randomness to create and how to use it, we took a step back, and considered instead the simplified subnetwork in Fig. 1b . We have two distributed source nodes (modeling L 1 and L 2 ) both connected through an erasure channel to a common destination node. The sources have access to a common rate limited random source. The channels are assumed independent and orthogonal (e.g., in different frequency bands). The eavesdropper is allowed to either overhear -through a broadcast erasure channel -the transmissions of node S 1 or node S 2 , but not both.
Even this simplified setting turns out to be challenging. Our characterization of the rate-region for the special case where the two sources aim to convey a common message is nontrivial (a linear program involving 8 inequalities). The inner for the general case is even more involved.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives our model and definitions. In Section III we summarize our results. We provide our scheme in Section IV. In Section V we describe our proof technique for an outer bound. We discuss a special case in Section VI.
II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider the network in Figure 1b where two sources S 1 and S 2 have each a private message, W 1 and W 2 , as well as a common message W , to send to a destination D, such that it remains secret from an eavesdropper Eve. Each source S k , k = 1, 2, communicates with D using a broadcast erasure channel with erasure probability δ k ; the channels S 1 −D and S 2 −D are orthogonal (e.g. operate in different frequency bands), and D is capable of receiving simultaneously over both. We will refer to S 1 −D as channel 1 and S 2 − D as channel 2. Eve overhears packets in one (but not both) of these channels, with erasure probability δ kE and independently from D. Since the location of Eve is not known, we can equivalently assume that there are two eavesdroppers E 1 and E 2 eavesdropping on channels 1 and 2 respectively, who do not share their knowledge with each other, and we want to protect the messages against both.
The channel inputs are length L vectors of F q symbols, which we call packets. To simplify notation, throughout the paper we express entropy and rate in terms of packets, which allows us to omit the constant factor L log q. We denote by X i = [X 1i , X 2i ] the inputs of channel 1 and channel 2 in the ith transmission, while
After the ith transmission, D causally sends a public acknowledgment F i ∈ {1, 2, 1&2, ∅}, to indicate whether he received correctly over channel 1, channel 2, both channels, or neither channel. More formally, we have that:
b) Random sources: We assume that S 1 and S 2 have access to a common random source of limited rate, that produces i.i.d. uniformly random packets with entropy rate C r . We denote by Ψ the set of random packets produced. We also assume that both sources can generate private randomness Θ 1 , Θ 2 of unlimited rate, independently of each other and from any other randomness in the system. c) Security and reliability: We assume that the messages W 1 , W 2 and W consist of N 1 , N 2 and N packets respectively. The messages are independent of each other. A secure communication scheme has five parameters (N 1 , N 2 , N, ǫ, n) and satisfies the following reliability and security conditions: N 2 , N, ǫ, n)-scheme has two sets of encoding functions f 1i and f 2i as well as a decoding map φ. The channel inputs at S 1 and S 2 are computed as
The messages are decoded correctly with high probability:
Furthermore, the messages remain secure from E 1 and E 2 :
Our goal is to find the achievable rate tuples (R 1 , R 2 , R):
+ is achievable if for any ǫ > 0 there exists a (N 1 , N 2 , N, ǫ, n)-scheme which satisfies
The following definition specifies the notion of secret key rate, which we use when describing our scheme.
Definition 3.
We say that a key generation step of S 1 achieves a certain key rate K r if for any ǫ ′′ > 0 there is a large enough n for which at the end of the step both S 1 and D can compute the same K with a probability at least 1 − ǫ ′′ , moreover K is uniformly distributed and
where κ is the number of transmissions done during the key generation step.
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We make two main contributions. First, we propose a (N 1 , N 2 , N, ǫ, n)-scheme that achieves the rate region described by the linear program LP1 in Theorem 1 (the detailed description of the variables can be found in Section IV). This scheme uses new techniques, as illustrated through an example in Section IV-A.
Theorem 1. If the following linear program LP1 is feasible with all parameter values nonnegative, then
is an achievable rate tuple.
Second, we derive a matching outer bound for the case when there are no private messages (R 1 = R 2 = 0), showing that in this case our scheme is optimal. The outer bound is in the form of another linear program LP2, which unfortunately involves 31 constraints and is thus delegated to an extended version of this paper [9] . Our proof of optimality shows that the optimal value of LP1 and LP2 coincides.
We conjecture the optimality of our scheme in general, yet we currently have a proof only for the case without private messages. We provide the complete proofs in [9] . IV. THE PROPOSED (N 1 , N 2 , N, ǫ, n)-SCHEME Our scheme uses the two-phase approach in [7] , [8] , where in a first phase we create secret keys, and in the second phase we consume them (in fact, we can retrieve the optimal scheme in [7] as a special case of our scheme by using parameter values R 2 = 0, R = 0 and C r = 0). More specifically:
1) Key generation phase: We create a secret key K 1 between S 1 and D that is secret from E 1 , and a secret key K 2 between S 2 and D that is secret from E 2 . That is, our scheme is such that for any ǫ ′ > 0 there exists a large enough n with:
where κ 1 , κ 2 are the number of transmissions (out of the total n) that S 1 and S 2 each allocate to the key generation phase (with the remaining tranmissions to be used in the message sending phase). Note that since E 1 and E 2 each overhears only one channel, and they do not collude, the keys K 1 and K 2 do not need to be independent.
2) Encrypted message transmission phase:
We appropriately split the common message W to two parts, and allocate to each source one part to send to D. Then, each source uses her own key and the same technique as in [7] to send over her channel the packets she is responsible for.
The new ideas in our scheme are in the key generation, since the encryption uses the same approach as in [7] . In particular, on how we use the common randomness. We illustrate next the basic principles using a simplified example.
A. Use of common randomness -a simplified example
The set of common random packets Ψ that both S 1 and S 2 have is a valuable resource for rate-efficient secret key generation, and to optimally use it we need to go beyond the techniques in [7] . To illustrate, we make in this subsection a simplifying assumption, that S 1 , S 2 , and D (causally) know which packets the eavesdroppers E 1 and E 2 have received. We underline that our scheme does not require any of the a) The same packet can be used in both keys: Our first observation is that, thanks to the common randomness, random packets sent through one of the channels can be used as keys on the other channel as well. Assume S 1 sends a packet from Ψ, say X 1 , over her channel 1 and D successfully receives it. If E 1 does not receive this packet (which will happen with a certain probability), S 1 can use this packet for her key K 1 . But, since S 2 also has all the packets in Ψ including X 1 , and since D now has X 1 , X 1 can always be used for the key K 2 . Indeed, X 1 was never sent over the channel 2, and thus E 2 knows nothing about it. In other words, the transmission of a single packet X 1 can contribute to both keys K 1 and K 2 , to K 1 with a certain probability, and to K 2 always, provided that the destination D receives it. Table I shows the case where X 1 contributes to both keys.
b) Retransmissions of the same packet can help: Since X 1 , if successfully received, can always be used in key K 2 , it may be worth trying to retransmit X 1 so that D receives it. Although retransmissions also increase the probability that E 1 overhears X 1 , there is still a non-zero probability that E 1 does not do so, in which case X 1 can also be used in K 1 (Table II shows this case). Thus retransmissions can be useful, more useful than S 1 sending a packet from her private randomness Θ 1 that can only contribute to her own key K 1 . Table III , assume that S 1 sends X 1 ∈ Ψ that E 1 receives but D does not. Moreover, S 2 sends X 2 ∈ Ψ that E 2 receives but D does not. Now X 1 definitely cannot contribute to key K 1 , and X 2 definitely cannot contribute to the key K 2 . Thus, if we attempt to retransmit one of these packets, say S 2 attempts to retransmit X 2 , this transmission will not be useful for S 2 herself. But assume instead that S 2 , since she also has X 1 , retransmits X 1 ⊕ X 2 , and assume that D receives this new packet while E 1 and E 2 do not. This transmission, X 1 ⊕X 2 , is more useful than simply retransmitting X 2 , since the received packet can now be used both in K 1 and K 2 . Indeed, E 1 only has X 1 , and does not know X 1 ⊕ X 2 ; similarly, E 2 only has X 2 and also does not know this packet. In other words, we take advantage of the fact that none of the eavesdroppers has received both packets X 1 and X 2 , to create a new packet both sources still have and is also secret from both eavesdroppers. In a sense, we perform a form of "privacy amplification" before transmission, to make our transmissions as efficient as possible. 
c) Transmission of linear combinations of unsuccessfully received packets can help: As illustrated in
Of course, in our scheme S 1 , S 2 and D will not know which packets exactly the eavesdropper has received; the take away message from the above is that, to be efficient, we can use coding to make the transmissions of common random packets as innovative as possible with respect to what Eve has received.
B. Detailed description
Our scheme uses some parameters that also appear in LP1 given in Theorem 1. The constraints of the LP capture the feasibility of the scheme. S 1 and S 2 carry out similar steps in parallel. We describe the steps of S 1 , the steps of S 2 follows from symmetry. We will see that the description relies on the properties that Lemmas 1-4 ensure. We provide the proofs of these Lemmas in [9] . • Split the common randomness Ψ (or potentially a part of it) into three disjoint sets of random packets:
We assign nr 1 packets to S 1 and nr 2 packets to S 2 . The third part, nc packets will be used commonly.
• S 1 and S 2 generate nk 1 and nk 2 random packets from their private randomness.
Key generation
• Step 2.1: S 1 sends the nr 1 packets assigned to it such that every packet is repeated until D correctly receives. Recall that the channel state is available, hence the source knows when to stop repeating a certain packet. S 1 does privacy amplification on these packets to get a secret key.
Lemma 1.
Step 2.1 achieves a secret key rate r 1
using no more than nr1 1−δ1 transmissions.
• Step 2.2: The packets sent by S 2 in the parallel step of Step 2.1 that S 2 performs become part of the key of S 1 .
Lemma 2.
Step 2.2 achieves a secret key of rate r 2 without using channel 1.
• Step 2.3: The nc packets from the common randomness are arranged into a L log q ×nc matrix C. Out of these packets nc 1 + nc 2 linear combination packets are produced to be sent by S 1 and S 2 respectively. The linear combinations are produced as follows:
S 1 sends the packets in C 1 once over the channel. Again a privacy amplification step is done.
• Step 2.4: Packets successfully received from C 2 (sent by S 2 ) contribute to the key of S 1 , which allows an additional key rate of c 2 (1 − δ 2 ). We note that Lemma 3 also ensures that the keys generated in Step 2.3 and in Step 2.4 are independent.
• Step 2.5: S 1 sends the nk 1 i.i.d. uniformly random packets generated from private randomness. Again, after privacy amplification a key is gained.
Lemma 4.
Step 2.5 achieves a secret key rate k 1 δ 1E (1 − δ 1 ) using nk 1 transmissions.
Overall we see that S 1 can produce a key with rate:
In different steps of the key generation different random sources are used to produce keys, thus • the keys computed in different steps are independent, so summing the key rate of each step correctly gives the overall rate of key generation,
• the eavesdropper cannot learn anything about a key produced in one step during another step, so the secrecy properties shown for the individual steps equally hold for the whole key, i.e. (12) is satisfied.
We also see that S 1 needs no more than n r1 1−δ1 + c 1 + k 1 transmissions in the key generation phase. Encrypted message sending
• Let K 1 denote the secret key set up between S 1 and D. Out of these key packets
, where G K1 is the generator of an MDS code. The number of rows of G K1 is the number of key packets generated (see Lemmas 1-4 for the exact numbers), and it has N 1 + N ′ columns. The encrypted packets are produced using a one-time-pad encryption with these encryption keys:
The other source S 2 performs a similar encryption to deliver the N ′′ message packets assigned to it. From [7] it is known that over the S 1 − D channel this construction achieves a secret message rate (1 − δ 1 )m 1 using nm 1 transmissions given a secret key of rate m 1
is available. The scheme description together with the referred lemmas give the proof of Theorem 1.
V. OUTER BOUND -PROOF TECHNIQUE
The proof technique we use for the outer bound is the following [9] . We build another linear program by showing general constraints (linear inequalities) on the achievable rate expressed in terms of various entropy and mutual information terms. We then treat every such term as a nonnegative variable which results in a new linear program. For example we derive that
, which turns the inequality into a linear constraint of our LP. Solving the resulting program for the maximum rate provides us an upper bound. We finally prove that the linear program that we derive with this method has the same optimal value as the linear program in Theorem 1.
VI. SPECIAL CASE: TWO PARALLEL CHANNELS
For the special case when R 1 = 0, R 2 = 0, C r = ∞, one can easily see that the problem becomes equivalent to the setting in Figure 3 , i.e., a single source connected to a receiver by two parallel orthogonal channels. What makes this problem nontrivial is that we do not know which channel the eavesdropper selects: even if δ 1 = δ 1E = δ 2 = δ 2E , that is, the two channels are statistically identical, it is not possible to achieve the rate we could if we knew which channel Eve is eavesdropping on (in contrast to wiretap networks where this was possible [3] ). Figure 2 shows the difference in the common rate R (assuming R 1 = R 2 = 0) we can achieve if we send non-securely, send securely while knowing Eve's location or not (with infinite common randomness), and having limited common randomness. For comparison we also plot For the case when R 1 = 0, R 2 = 0, C r = ∞, we have seen that our scheme is optimal. Thanks to the unlimited rate common randomness, we can simplify the scheme: there is no need for retransmissions in the key generation phase, and there is no need to use private randomness, i.e., r 1 = r 2 = k 1 = k 2 = 0. In the linear program that describes the scheme constraints (4)- (5) and (10)- (11) are not needed any more. (
The "if" part of the theorem is already shown by the scheme described in Section IV. We give the complete proof in the extended version of this paper [9] .
